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Fictionality is without doubt the central question of literary 
semantics. Just as most semantical problems in natural language 
are Inr.epurable from the determining influence of use, 
fictionality could and should be examined from a pragmatical point 
of view ai; well, and even certain syntactical pecularities and 
special use of the vocabulary may be pointed out in a more or less 
limited circle of fictional texts. However, the decisive point in 
fictionality seems to be connected with the eminent semantical 
problem of truth. The problem ist how can truth and other semantical 
notions presupposing it, such as validity, consequence, etc., be 
accounted for in a class of so-called fictional texts which are 
known not to reflect actual reality. Literary theory has offered 
a number of rather controversial theories concerning this 
question, but there are valuable contributions in philosophy, 
linguistics, psychology, logic etc. as well. In thie way an all-
embracing theory of fictionality can only be worked out if the 
different attempts are taken into account and en adequate 
metalanguage is formulated in which the relevant problems can 
be satisfactorily dealt with. In this respect we can only 
formulate a preliminary investigation aimed at grasping some 
theoretically important variant characteristics of fictionality 
in the essays of modern logico-semantic research. 
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A systematic overview of t h i s f i e l d of research fr^m such 
a point of view proves to be very e s s e n t i a l and i l l u m i n a t i n g : the 
p r e r e q u i s i t e s of a theory of f i c t i o n a l i t y are n e c e s s a r i l y impl ied 
by the l o g i c a l systems applied i n modern semantics, and w e l l -
founded conception of f i c t i o n a l i t y can only be based on the 
relevant semantic research. On the other hand we have a negative 
experience as wells the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between d i f f e r e n t 
conceptions do not disappear with the t r a n s i t i o n from an informal 
and inexact methodology to a formal and exact one. Modern semantics 
being as such divided between c o n t r a v e r s i a l tendencies provides 
arguments f o r d i f f e r e n t standpoints on the question of f i o t i o n a l i t y . 
I t i s t h i s p l u r a l i t y of views chal lenging any t h e o r e t i c a l endeavour 
to account for t h i s phenomenon that we are going to deal with. Our 
i n t e r e s t i s not h i s t o r i c a l , but t h e o r e t i c a l , and we are p r i m a r i l y 
a t t r a c t e d not by mere f a c t u a l i t y but by the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
which have come to l i g h t i n the h i s t o r i c a l process. We attempt to 
reduce to an underlying coincidence the controversies that have 
played such a d e c i s i v e r o l e i n the development of t h i s branch of 
scienoe as mere appearances. I f t h i s w i l l not work because of 
l o g i c a l i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of the views i n question we try to d e l i m i t 
the d i f f e r e n t v a r i a n t s i n an unambigoua way. 
I n order to sua up our v a s t material i n an economical way i t 
seems best to r e l y upon some general t h e o r e t i c a l theses concerning 
semantics and f i c t i o n a l i t y . I n accordance with Castaiiedas' theory 
of f i c t i o n a l i t y we are of the opinion that each community which 
knows f i c t i o n a l i t y and a p p l i e s i t i n soae language games has to 
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d i s t i n g u i s h two fundamental domains i n i t s naive or s c i e n t i f i c 
semantics, namely a c t u a l i t y and f i c t i o n a l i t y . The question of 
which domain a c e r t a i n utterance belongs to can be decided on 
the b a s i s of the convent ions underlying the communication-game 
in which the utterance i s embedded, that i s by menas of the 
p r a c t i c a l knowledge of language use. The semantic d i s t i n c t i o n 
mentioned i s connected with a p o s s i b l e twofold o r i e n t a t i o n of 
r e f e r e n c e : i n the case of a c t u a l i t y there i s a r e l a t i o n between 
meaning and the a c t u a l world, whereas i n the case of f i c t i o n a l i t y 
the r e l a t i o n l i e u between meaning and an imaginary world. 
Nonwithstanding t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n reference both domains can be 
s e a a n t i o a l l y characterized i n respect of truth, consequence, 
v a l i d i t y e t c . | that Means that the p r a g s a t i e a l opposition between 
a c t u a l i t y and f i c t i o n a l i t y must not be interpreted as a semantic 
opposit ion between truth and falsehood. On the other hand t r u t h 
i n a o t u a l i t y w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y correspond to truth i n 
f i c t i o n a l i t y j u s t beoause of d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n of the 
reference r e l a t i o n i n each domain. 
I f we now consider one of the main disagreements i n aodern 
semantics concerning f i c t i o n a l i t y we see that i t i s olosely 
connected with a d i f f e r e n t a p p r a i s a l of the reference r e l a t i o n 
i n f i c t i o n a l context regarding t r u t h . I n order to formulate p l a i n l y 
the oontravers ial standpoints we have c l e a r up some terminological 
questions. According to our working hypothesis we d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
two domains c o n s i s t i n g of s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t sets of o b j e c t s , the 
f i r s t s e t s out from objects of the a c t u a l world and defines t h e i r 
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p r o p e r t i e s , r e l a t i o n s , etc» while the second i s based on 
f i c t i o n a l objects and t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
supposed to be found i n Imaginary worlds. We c a l l an expression 
f i c t i o n a l i f i t a p p l i e s to a f i o t i o n a l object and consequently 
has no reference i n a c t u a l i t y . A sentence can be considered as 
f i o t i o n a l i f the s u b j e c t - c o n s t i t u e n t proves to be a f i o t i o n a l 
expression. Wc should l i k e to underl ine that t h i s connection 
i s taken here i n the sense of a t e s t and not as the source of 
f i c t i o n a l i t y - the l a t t e r r a t h e r oomplex problem should be 
dispensed with i n our present exposit ion. The l i m i t a t i o n of the 
f i c t i o n a l expression to the s u b j e c t r o l e aims obviously at avoiding 
p o s s i b l e ambiguities which may appear e. g. i n the o b j e c t case 
a f t e r an i n t e n s i o n a l verb. By means 01 t h i s test we c e r t a i n l y 
cannot d e l i m i t f i c t i o n and n o n - f i c t i o n i n an unaabigous way, 
but we are able to point out a c l a s s of sentences which are 
without doubt f i c t i o n a l . I n respect to t h i s c l a s s some general 
semantic statements can be formulated. We s h a l l c a l l the f i r s t 
two apparently c o n t r o v e r s i a l ones B u s s e l l i a n and Heinongian 
Formulae as they have been propounded i n the most convincing 
way i n the work of the w e l l known B r i t i s h and A u s t r i a n 
philosopher, r e s p e c t i v e l y . The B u s i e l l i a n Formula can be stated 
i n the fol lowing ways 
(RF) F i c t i o n a l sentences are n e c e s s a r i l y f a l s e 
Thin t h e s i s , as we know from the o l a s s i o a l study "On Denoting'*, 
i s based on the i n s i g h t that f i c t i o n a l objects have no reference 
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i n a c t u a l i t y , and truth was coacieved of here aa a r e l a t i o n 
between meaning and a c t u a l i t y . 
The Mainongian Formula can be c o r r e c t l y formulated aa 
dependent on the reference r e l a t i o n ! 
(MP) F i c t i o n a l sentences apply to a c e r t a i n cleaa of 
objects 
As a c o r o l l a r y of the Meinongian Formula we have the following 
postulationi 
(MP) F i o t i o n a l sentences are true or f a l s e 
I f we consider the assignement of truth i n both oases, the two 
formulae seen to contradict eaoh other. However the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
formulation of truth i n both cases i s a consequease of the 
conception of the reference r e l a t i o n which i n a deeper a n a l y s i s 
reveals i t s e l f as incomplete i n each case i n a p e c u l i a r way. 
I n the l i g h t of our t h e o r e t i c a l remarks both foraulee have to be 
supplemented by the assignement of the reference r e l a t i o n to 
either of the two domains of possible applications a c t u a l i t y and 
f i c t i o n a l i t y . I n t h i s respeot the correct formulation of the 
B u s s e l l i a n Formula seems to bat 
( R F ' ) F i c t i o n a l sentences ere necessari ly f a l s e with 
I 
respect to a c t u a l i t y 
whereas the Meinongian Formula appears as 
(MF') F i o t i o n a l sentences have f i o t i o n a l objects 
as reference i n f i c t i o n a l i t y 
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These completed formulae do not contradict each otlwr, and 
insofar as one does not worry about noainalistic provisos' 
concerning the ontological status of fictional objects and 
imaginary worlds, both of them can be considered as not only 
compatible, but as true stateaents in a semantio theory of 
fiotionality. If we are right in the theory of fictionality 
the necessity does not arise of opting exclusively either for 
the Bussellian or for the Meinongian Formula: the problea is 
rather to account for their inner connection and correlation. 
The logico-seaantic tradition offers not only the priaary 
Foraulae mentioned but some competing variants as well. Besides 
the Bussellian Formula we have the Frege - Strawson Position 
formulating the first approach 
(FSP) Fictional sentences have no' significance 
In this view a sentence aust be first syntactically and 
seaantically coaplete, that is significative, in order for it 
possibly to have truth-value assignaent. A fictional sentence i a 
-qualified as incomplete because of the lacking referential relation 
in the actuality, and therefore the negative seaaatio status is 
registered not as falsehood as in the Bussellian Formula, but 
as one without significance. One ia certainly aware that the 
Frege - Strawson Position represents an alternative standpoint 
to the Bussellian Foraula, although both of thea aay be true, 
but not connected with each other as the theala of a unified 
theory. Vhioh one should be preferred depends on pragaatical 
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criteria. On the other hand the Frege - Strawson - Position 
is just as incompletely formulated as the Russellian Formula 
and needs the same complement) 
(FSP*) Fictional sentences have no significance with 
respect to actuality 
Opposed to the ontologically founded Meinongian Formula we have 
the variant of model-theoretic intensional logic where a set of 
possible logical worlds is introduced as a primitive tera and 
fictional expression, imaginary world, etc. can be defined 
with respeot to it: 
(NIL) The truth of fictional sentences is decidable 
in a model the interpretation part of which is 
necessarily based on a possible world not identical 
with the actual one 
This foraulation already takes into account the reliance on 
fictionality with reapect to the referential relation. The 
•odel-theoretic formulation represents yet another variant: 
if we had more space, we could even differentiate several 
variants according to the different concsptions of reference 
within intensional logic. There should be formulated at least 
one variant based on the theory of rigid designators and 
another on the basis of transworld-identity. However what we 
need is not only an exhaustive classification but at the sane 
time an effective systematization and in this respect we have 
done our work by halves. Let us return to the first mentioned 
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Ruesellian and Neinongian Formulae: their relation to each 
other can illuminate in a comparatively simple form the 
connection of the two determining trends in the semantics of 
fictionality. We have spoken about a compatibility between 
Russellian and Meinongian Formulae, however, thiB compatibility 
applies only to the conception of reference and in connection 
with it to the definition of the truth-relation, that is, to the 
seaantically-relevant relations of fictionality, and it cannot 
in the least be extended to the congruence of Russallian and 
Meinongian semantics or philosophy. As far as regards the two 
semantic systems the following main differences can be enumerated: 
(1) Ruesellian and Meinongian semantics are baaed on different 
sign conceptions 
(2) Ruesellian semantics presupposes the well-known extensioital 
logic; Meinongian semantics is connected with a sort of free 
logic a main characteristic ot which consists in the 
distinction of predicate negation and sentence-negation. 
By this means Meinong is not compelled to accept the Law 
of excluded Middle with an absolute validity as it is 
conceived of in extensional logic. 
(3) concerning its ontologicnl foundation Russellian semantics 
can be characterized as nominalistic, whereas Meinongian 
semantics appears to be a representative of the realistic 
tradition. 
These nemiotic, logic and ontological divergences have 
surely to be taken into account if we want to formulate an all-
embracing theory of fictionality. As a matter of fact there are 
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several possibilities to proceed according to special preferences 
in ontological and even in logical and terminological questions. 
Not having space for a typological review of possible opinions 
we must content ourselves with the scheua of a unique variant 
determined by our own predilections. Ontologically we opt for 
a non-dogmatic nominalisir which permits us to consider 
fictional reference, fictional objectB, imaginary worlds etc., 
as linguistic and/or other conventional appearances which do not 
necessarily require a special ontological foundation, but can 
be reduced from the ontological setting of actual objactB and 
their properties, relations, etc. by means of different mental 
operations. As to logic the extensional system appears to be 
rather limited; Meinongian and other modern intensional 
philosophical logic systems have subtle methods of dealing 
with questions which remain without the scope of extensional 
logic and stand in the foreground of semantic and philosophical 
research. Therefore the solution is sought for in a direction 
where the totality of the linguistic-semantic appearances are 
seriously and exhaustively accounted for without any ontological 
commitment over and above a special, conventional agreement 
between the members of the community for the use of a language-
game . 
We have tried to enumerate some impulses that the study 
of the logico-semantic tradition may give to a modern theory 
of fictionality. We must admit there are other possible 
conclusions that one can deduce from this complex theoretical 
research. Nevertheless ore connection seems to be of general 
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importance and that ia that the nuaber of possible divergent 
views on fictionality is essentially Halted to a rather 
restricted circle of variants aade possible by theoretically 
and/or methodologically different accounts of reference 
relation in fictionality. The number of these variants is 
not irrevocably deterained, it aay increase with scientific 
developaents. A further aia should be to get an adequate 
description of these variants in order to gain deeper insights 
into the coaplex phenomenon of fictionality. 
